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California Law Update – October/November 2017

By November 30, 2017April 22nd, 2018Law Updates
  1. (Elder Abuse Act) In case alleging death following unnecessary pacemaker surgery, trial court errs in summarily adjudicating elder abuse cause of action. Stewart v. Superior Court (St. Joseph’s Health). (No. E067316, Super. Ct. No. CIVVS1205737, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, October 12, 2017)
  2. (Employer Liability) Summary judgment affirmed where plaintiff fails to present evidence showing that employer is liable for its employee’s conduct under special errand rule. Morales-Simental v. Genentech, Inc. (No. A145865, Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HG13678136, California Courts of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, October 19, 2017)
  3. (Reimbursement) Company that acquired medical provider’s accounts receivables not entitled to additional reimbursement where it failed to establish services rendered were for emergency. YDM Management Co, Inc. v. Sharp Community Medical Group, Inc. (No. D071244, Super. Ct. No. 37-2014-00042397-CU-CO-CTL, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, October 25, 2017)
  4. (Restraining Orders) Court has specific jurisdiction over matter where out-of-state defendant sends disturbing video to plaintiff in California. Hogue v. Hogue. (No. C083285, Super. Ct. No. 16-DV-00352, California Courts of Appeal, Third Appellate District, Sacramento, October 30, 2017)
  5. (Administrative Agencies) Board’s revocation of physical therapist’s license based on dangerous use of alcohol does not require separate showing that therapist’s conduct affected therapist’s profession. Walker v. Physical Therapy Board. (No. D071984, Super. Ct. No. 30-2015-00769721, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, November 8, 2017)
  6. (Sanctions) Court may impose ‘hefty’ monetary sanction on litigant where litigant repeatedly fails to comply with court’s order. Padron v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (No. D070723, Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00067529-CU-PO-CTL, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, November 9, 2017)
  7. (Standing) A website has standing under ‘Glassdoor’ to assert the First Amendment rights of an anonymous reviewer. Yelp Inc. v. The Superior Court of Orange County (Montagna). (No. G054358 consol. w/G054422, Super. Ct. No. 30-2016-00848551, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, November 13, 2017)
  8. (Premises Liability) Church’s siting of offsite parking abutting public street insufficient to confer duty to prevent injuries sustained by churchgoer as he crossed the street. Vasilenko. Grace Family Church. (No. S235412, Ct. App. 3 C074801, Sacramento County Super. Ct. No. 34-2011-00097580, California Supreme Court, November 13, 2017)
  9. (Malicious Prosecution) Voluntary dismissal of the prior action may constitute the ‘favorable termination’ requirement in a malicious prosecution proceeding. Medley Capital Corporation v. Security National Guaranty, Inc. et al. (No. A147726, San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC15547788, California Courts of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, November 13, 2017)
  10. (Constitutional Law) Collecting petition signatures while trespassing on private property immediately adjacent to grocery entryway is not constitutionally protected activity. Ralphs Grocery Company et al. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. et al. (No. D070804, Super. Ct. No. 37-2015-00031668-CU-NP-CTL, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, November 15, 2017)
  11. (Power of Attorney) After rehearing, panel again finds attorney-in-fact exceeds authority under power of attorney to admit principal to residential care facility, thus precluding facility from enforcing arbitration agreement contained in admission agreement. Hutcheson v. Eskaton Fountainwood Lodge. (No. C074846, Super. Ct. No. 34-2012-00135467-CU-PO-GDS, California Courts of Appeal, Third Appellate District, Sacramento, November 18, 2017)
  12. (Anti-SLAPP) Judgment granting anti-SLAPP motion reversed where statements are not opinions but rather state or imply a provably false assertion of fact. Dickinson v. Cosby. (No. B271470, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC580909, California Courts of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, November 21, 2017)
  13. (Improper Forum) Dismissal affirmed where party who raises improper forum objection when he or she demurs does not forfeit improper forum issue. Laboratory Specialists International, Inc. v. Shimadzu Scientific Instruments, Inc. (No. G054056, Super. Ct. No. 30-2015-00812029, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, November 21, 2017)
  14. (Settlement Agreements) Confidential settlement agreement granting parties power to request trial court retain jurisdiction to enforce settlement is not enough, without any actual request, to preserve subject matter jurisdiction. Sayta v. Chu. (No. A148823, San Francisco City and County Super. Ct. No. CGC-15-543620, California Courts of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, November 29, 2017)
  15. (Government Claims Act) Grievance filed against Manhattan Beach unified School District does not put plaintiff in substantial compliance of Government Claims Act because it did not contain many elements required by Act. Olson v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District. (No. B272340, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YC070160, California Courts of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, November 29, 2017)

The above referenced matters have come to our attention during the last two months. Please find below a brief summary of these newly issued opinions.

  1. (Elder Abuse Act) In case alleging death following unnecessary pacemaker surgery, trial court errs in summarily adjudicating elder abuse cause of action. Stewart v. Superior Court (St. Joseph’s Health). (No. E067316, Super. Ct. No. CIVVS1205737, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, October 12, 2017)

In this case, the decedent was a patient at defendant medical center. The decedent’s partner, and a registered nerve, served as his durable power of attorney (“DPOA”) for health care decisions. The defendant hospital of risk management department concluded that a pacemaker procedure could be performed on the patient despite the patient’s DPOA having express objection to it. The patient went into cardiac arrest following the procedure. The pacemaker was surgically removed and the patient died approximately two months later. The patient’s partner and durable partner of attorney sued the hospital and others for, among other causes of action, violation of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Act). The plaintiff sought a writ of mandate after the trial court summarily granted the hospital’s motion for summary adjudication as to the elder abuse claim and two other claims.

The appeals court granted the petition. The Act protects elders and dependent adults and makes liable a defendant “for physical abuse as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.63, or neglect as defined in section 15610.57,” when the defendant acted with “recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice.”

The appeals court emphasized the importance of an elderly person’s right to autonomy in making medical decisions and explained that substantial impairment of that right could amount to actionable neglect under the Act. The court found that the hospital denied the patient the right to personal autonomy by authorizing its doctors to sign the consent for the pacemaker on his behalf. Because the plaintiff raised triable issues of material fact regarding whether neglect occurred under the above section, the court issued a writ of mandate and directed the trial courts deny the hospital’s summary adjudication motion.

  1. (Employer Liability) Summary judgment affirmed where plaintiff fails to present evidence showing that employer is liable for its employee’s conduct under special errand rule. Morales-Simental v. Genentech, Inc. (No. A145865, Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HG13678136, California Courts of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, October 19, 2017)

Plaintiff sued defendant after defendant’s employee struck the car that the plaintiff’s decedent was in with his vehicle. The employee was on his way to the defendant’s office to review resumes “outside of his normal working hours.” Plaintiff argued that the employer was liable for the employee’s negligence under the Respondeat Superior Doctrine, which makes employers liable for the “tortious conduct of its employers within the scope of their employment.” The trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment finding that the employer was not liable pursuant to the going and coming rule, which precludes employers from liability if the employee’s conduct occurred while the employee was commuting to or from work. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the court’s ruling arguing that the employer was liable under the special errand exception to the going and coming rule.

The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Under the special errand rule, an employee who performs “an errand as part of his [or her] regular duties or at the specific order of his [or her] employer” is within the scope of his or her employment. Here, the employee was on his way to the employer’s office to review resumes when the accident occurred. Plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer requested its employee to report to the employer’s office to review resumes on the morning of the accident. Additionally, the plaintiff failed to show that the employee was driving to the employer that morning as part of his regular duties. Hence, in the absence of a triable issue of fact, the court affirmed the summary judgment motion.

  1. (Reimbursement) Company that acquired medical provider’s accounts receivables not entitled to additional reimbursement where it failed to establish services rendered were for emergency. YDM Management Co, Inc. v. Sharp Community Medical Group, Inc. (No. D071244, Super. Ct. No. 37-2014-00042397-CU-CO-CTL, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, October 25, 2017)

Defendant, an independent practice association (IPA), provided health insurance to its members. As an IPA, it pays claims through services provided to its members. Plaintiff acquired an entity known as Doctors Express, an operator of urgent care facilities, which rendered care to the IPA members, but it did not have a preferred contract with the IPA. Nevertheless, the IPA reimbursed Doctors Express for the non-emergency medical services rendered to its members at “below” rates. The plaintiff subsequently acquired Doctors Express’ accounts receivable and sought additional reimbursement from the IPA, alleging emergency services were rendered, requiring payment at “customary or usual” rates. The IPA successfully moved for summary judgment because the plaintiff could not establish that emergency services were rendered.

The defendant pointed out that Doctors Express operated urgent care facilities and is specifically licensed to operate an emergency department. However, nothing in the law or regulation that only facilities licensed to operate as an emergency department may provide emergency services. Nevertheless, it was undisputed that Doctors Express admitted reimbursement claims using the “universally used” current procedural technology (CPT) codes, which would have identified the services as emergency services. However, none of the codes used identified the services as such. Overall, the appeals court found that summary judgment was proper.

  1. (Restraining Orders) Court has specific jurisdiction over matter where out-of-state defendant sends disturbing video to plaintiff in California. Hogue v. Hogue. (No. C083285, Super. Ct. No. 16-DV-00352, California Courts of Appeal, Third Appellate District, Sacramento, October 30, 2017)

In this matter, the appeals court ruled that an individual could get a restraining order against her spouse even though he resided outside the state of California. Plaintiff sought a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act against her estranged husband after moving back to California from Georgia. In April of 2016, defendant made a special appearance thought counsel to move to quash the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion. Never having been served with notice of entry of the order, plaintiff timely filed a notice of appeal.

On appeal, plaintiff contended California has jurisdiction over the defendant because either his conduct came within the “special regulation” basis for specific jurisdiction, or otherwise justified specific jurisdiction as a continuing course of conduct commencing in California and thereafter directed toward California after defendant left the state. The appeals court agreed with the former premise and vacated the order quashing service, and remanded for consideration of the merits of the plaintiff’s petition. The court found that the defendant could be made subject to the specific jurisdiction of California courts if the controversy arose out of sufficient, purposeful contacts in California. Here, the plaintiff’s ex-spouse sent plaintiff a video of a mock suicide while the plaintiff was in California. The disturbing video gave California courts personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s matter.

  1. (Administrative Agencies) Board’s revocation of physical therapist’s license based on dangerous use of alcohol does not require separate showing that therapist’s conduct affected therapist’s profession. Walker v. Physical Therapy Board. (No. D071984, Super. Ct. No. 30-2015-00769721, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, November 8, 2017)

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the trial court denying her petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. Plaintiff asked the court to set aside a decision of the Physical Therapy Board of California (the “Board”) subjecting the plaintiff to discipline based on a misdemeanor hit and run conviction and the Board’s finding that she had used alcohol in a manner dangerous to herself or others. The trial court concluded the misdemeanor conviction was not an appropriate ground for discipline because it was not sufficiently related to the plaintiff’s fitness to practice physical therapy, but that discipline was appropriate pursuant to Business & Professions Code sections 2239 and 2260 based on the plaintiff’s use of alcohol in a dangerous manner. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the court erred because the statutes did not permit discipline of a physical therapist based on a single, isolated instance of alcohol use in a dangerous manner without specific finding of a nexus between the conduct at issue and the fitness of the individual to practice physical therapy.

The appeals court concluded that sections 2239 and 2260 did permit the Board to impose discipline in this context and affirmed the judgment.

  1. (Sanctions) Court may impose ‘hefty’ monetary sanction on litigant where litigant repeatedly fails to comply with court’s order. Padron v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (No. D070723, Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00067529-CU-PO-CTL, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, November 9, 2017)

This case presented the issue whether a court can impose a hefty daily monetary sanction on a party who steadfastly refuses to comply with a discovery order. Here, the court ordered defendant to produce documents responsive to a specific request for production. Per the court’s order, documents would be redacted to protect certain third-party’s privacy rights and produce subject to a strict confidentiality and non-disclosure order negotiated by the defendant. In addition, the court ordered the defendant to look for documents and files it represented, on multiple occasions, to be in its possession, custody, and/or control. Defendant informed the court that it would not comply with the order. As such, plaintiff brought a motion for monetary sanctions against plaintiff for its discovery abuses. The court awarded sanctions in the amount of $4,000 per day for non-compliance with the order, and the defendant appealed.

The appeals court affirmed, finding that courts have considerable discretion to manage discovery. Here, the court allowed defendant to argue its position and even appointed a discovery referee who thoroughly considered defendant’s contentions. Nonetheless, defendant refused to comply with the court’s order. Furthermore, defendant repeated arguments that it lost. Because defendant failed to submit to the court’s authority and failed to comply with the rules that “all litigants” must “follow in Superior Court,” the lower court had the authority to impose the sanctions.

  1. (Standing) A website has standing under ‘Glassdoor’ to assert the First Amendment rights of an anonymous reviewer. Yelp Inc. v. The Superior Court of Orange County (Montagna). (No. G054358 consol. w/G054422, Super. Ct. No. 30-2016-00848551, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, November 13, 2017)

Plaintiff, an accountant, filed a trade libel lawsuit against defendant. Plaintiff prepared defendant’s tax returns for a fee that was twice his original quote. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants then posted a negative review on the plaintiff’s Yelp website, using an alias. Plaintiff asserted the review’s statements were provably false and that the defendants failed to retract or correct the Yelp review. Plaintiff served Yelp with a subpoena to produce their business records to secure information about the review. Yelp argued that compelling the production of documents violated the free speech rights of the anonymous user, and refused to comply. The trial court found that Yelp lacked standing to enforce the anonymous reviewer’s first amendment rights, and held that plaintiff was entitled to discovery regarding the reviewer’s identity.

The appeals court denied the writ of mandate petition filed by Yelp. Under Glassdoor, Inc. v. Superior Court, a website host has standing to assert the first amendment rights of persons who post anonymous reviews on its site. Nonetheless, the order compelling Yelp to produce the information regarding the anonymous user’s identity was justified because plaintiff demonstrated a sufficient prima facie defamation case.

  1. (Premises Liability) Church’s siting of offsite parking abutting public street insufficient to confer duty to prevent injuries sustained by churchgoer as he crossed the street. Vasilenko. Grace Family Church. (No. S235412, Ct. App. 3 C074801, Sacramento County Super. Ct. No. 34-2011-00097580, California Supreme Court, November 13, 2017)

Plaintiff was struck by a car as he crossed a public street between the main premises of defendant church and the church’s overflow parking area. The plaintiff contended the church owed him a duty of care to assist him in safely crossing the public street and the church was negligent in failing to do so. The church argued that it had no control over the public street and therefore, did not owe the plaintiff a duty to prevent his injury under the principle that landowners have no duty to protect others from dangers on abutting streets unless the landowner creates the dangers.

The appeals court concluded that a landowner does not have a duty to assist invitees in crossing a public street when the landowner does no more than maintain a parking lot that requires invitees to cross the street to access the landowner’s premises, so long as the street’s dangers are not obscured or magnified by some condition of the landowner’s premises or by some action taken by the landowner. Because plaintiff did not allege that the church did anything other than maintain a parking lot on the other side of the street, the court found that the church did not owe him a duty to prevent his injury.

  1. (Malicious Prosecution) Voluntary dismissal of the prior action may constitute the ‘favorable termination’ requirement in a malicious prosecution proceeding. Medley Capital Corporation v. Security National Guaranty, Inc. et al. (No. A147726, San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC15547788, California Courts of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, November 13, 2017)

Plaintiff was sued by defendant for fraud. The action arose as part of a cross-complaint filed by the defendant. The underlying lawsuit involved claims against several defendants in connection with a development. The defendant was advised multiple times by the plaintiff that it had no involvement in the actions’ related transaction, yet refused to dismiss the claims against the plaintiff. After the defendant settled the main lawsuit, it filed a voluntary dismissal in favor of the plaintiff. Subsequently, plaintiff sued defendant for malicious prosecution. Defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, which was denied. The trial court concluded that plaintiff met its burden under the anti-SLAPP statute by demonstrating a probability of success on its claim.

The appeals court affirmed, finding that case law supported the trial court’s finding that the merits of a case is not necessary to demonstrate “favorable termination” in the plaintiff’s favor. Furthermore, no probable cause existed because defendant’s attorney was notified that plaintiff was not a proper party. Nor did defendant produce documentation showing plaintiff had any connection to the underlying loan. Finally, malice may be inferred by defendant’s indifference to researching the facts prior to filing the cross-complaint, and its issuance of a misleading press release naming the plaintiff.

  1. (Constitutional Law) Collecting petition signatures while trespassing on private property immediately adjacent to grocery entryway is not constitutionally protected activity. Ralphs Grocery Company et al. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. et al. (No. D070804, Super. Ct. No. 37-2015-00031668-CU-NP-CTL, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, November 15, 2017)

Plaintiff appealed an order striking its complaint against defendant under Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP law). The plaintiffs contended the court erred in determining that their complaint, which alleged a cause of action for trespass, arose out of activity protected by the anti-SLAPP law, and by concluding, they failed to demonstrate a probability of succeeding on the merits for that cause of action.

The appeals court agreed with the plaintiff, finding that the defendant did not show that the plaintiffs’ cause of action for trespass arose out of protected activity. The acts constituting trespass were not protected activity. Although the defendants argued that plaintiffs were suing them based on petitioning activity, which would typically be protected, such activities occurred on private property. Defendants had provided no persuasive argument that their activity occurring on such private property was protected. Additionally, even if the appeals court did reach the second question under an anti-SLAPP analysis, it would conclude that the plaintiffs carried their minimal burden of showing a probability of succeeding on the merits. Therefore, it reversed the order of the trial court.

  1. (Power of Attorney) After rehearing, panel again finds attorney-in-fact exceeds authority under power of attorney to admit principal to residential care facility, thus precluding facility from enforcing arbitration agreement contained in admission agreement. Hutcheson v. Eskaton Fountainwood Lodge. (No. C074846, Super. Ct. No. 34-2012-00135467-CU-PO-GDS, California Courts of Appeal, Third Appellate District, Sacramento, November 18, 2017)

This case involved the issue of whether an attorney-in-fact made a “healthcare decision” by admitting her principal to a residential care facility for the elderly and, in the process, agreeing to an arbitration clause. If she did, as the trial court found, she acted outside of the scope of her authority under the power of attorney, and the arbitration clause her appeal seeks to enforce was void.

The appeals court concluded that the admission to the residential care facility for the elderly, in this instance, was a healthcare decision, and the attorney-in-fact who admitted her, acting under the Power of Attorney Law (Probate Code section 400 et seq.) was no authorization to make healthcare decisions on behalf of the principal.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion by the residential care facility to compel arbitration. Because the attorney-in-fact, acting under the power of attorney, did not have authority to make healthcare decisions for her principal, her execution of the admission agreement and its arbitration clause were found to be void.

  1. (Anti-SLAPP) Judgment granting anti-SLAPP motion reversed where statements are not opinions but rather state or imply a provably false assertion of fact. Dickinson v. Cosby. (No. B271470, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC580909, California Courts of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, November 21, 2017)

Plaintiff publicized her rape accusations against defendant. After the allegations were publicized, defendant’s attorney issued a press release and a demand letter. The attorney sent the letter to various media outlets, and, in it, asked media not to repeat the “allegedly false accusation” and threatened litigation. The letter specifically characterized the plaintiff’s accusation as a “false and outlandish [claim]” and an a “outrageous and defamatory lie.” The letter further stated, among other things, that “the alleged rape never happened.” Plaintiff then sued the defendant and his attorney for defamation. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion arguing the statements made in the letter were opinions “based on fully disclosed facts.” The court granted the motion regarding the demand letter.

The appeals court reversed. Although the defendant claimed that the statements made in the letter were opinions “based on fully disclosed facts,” the letter actually “stated or implied the provably false assertion of fact that the defendant did not rape the plaintiff and she was lying when she said she did.” The language of the letter supported the conclusion because it showed that the letter was not “phrased cautiously in terms of opinion.” The court also determined that the press releases did not come with in the litigation privilege.

  1. (Improper Forum) Dismissal affirmed where party who raises improper forum objection when he or she demurs does not forfeit improper forum issue. Laboratory Specialists International, Inc. v. Shimadzu Scientific Instruments, Inc. (No. G054056, Super. Ct. No. 30-2015-00812029, California Courts of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, November 21, 2017)

Plaintiff appealed from a trial court’s order dismissing its lawsuit against defendant under the forum selection clause in the parties’ contract. Plaintiff contended that defendant committed a fatal procedural misstep by requesting a dismissal in its demurrer dismissal based on the forum selection clause, rather than a separate motion, and that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s leave to recast its request for dismissal in a separate motion.

The appeals court affirmed. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 (e) (3)’s forfeiture provision, failing to “make a motion under [the] section at the time of the filing of a demurrer” waives “the issue of inconvenient forum.” Here, defendant raised its forum objection when it demurred. Thus, because it did not fail to raise its objection “at the time” it demurred; it did not forfeit the issue of inconvenient forum. Further, section 418.10 (e) (3) does not state that forum issues require separate motions.

  1. (Settlement Agreements) Confidential settlement agreement granting parties power to request trial court retain jurisdiction to enforce settlement is not enough, without any actual request, to preserve subject matter jurisdiction. Sayta v. Chu. (No. A148823, San Francisco City and County Super. Ct. No. CGC-15-543620, California Courts of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, November 29, 2017)

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against defendant alleging various causes of action arising from efforts to terminate the plaintiff’s tenancy. The suit was resolved by a written settlement agreement. The complaint, and a cross complaint against the plaintiff, were dismissed by the parties. Plaintiff subsequently brought a motion to enforce the settlement pursuant to section 664.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, alleging breach of confidentiality provision and seeking liquidating damages. The trial court denied the motion on the merits and plaintiff appealed.

The appeals court reversed the decision of the trial court. Because the parties failed to request, before dismissal, that the trial court retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, or alternatively seek to set aside the dismissals, the appeals court found the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion.

Within the settlement agreement, the parties agreed that the parties “could request the Superior court to retain jurisdiction,” and “set aside the dismissal on the request of either party.” However, nothing in the record indicates that any party did either. The court found that a request for retention of jurisdiction must occur during the pendency of the case, be made by the parties themselves, and be either made in a signed writing or made orally before the court. Because the parties did not communicate any requests or the court requesting retention, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the section 664.6 motion because “it lost such jurisdiction over the case when the last of the requests for dismissal were filed.”

  1. (Government Claims Act) Grievance filed against Manhattan Beach unified School District does not put plaintiff in substantial compliance of Government Claims Act because it did not contain many elements required by Act. Olson v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District. (No. B272340, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YC070160, California Courts of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, November 29, 2017)

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment dismissing its complaint against defendant school district after the trial court sustained the defendant school district’s demurrer on the grounds that a grievance, filed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, did not satisfy the claim filing requirements of the Government Claims Act (Government Code section 810 et seq.). Plaintiff contended that his non-compliance was excused under the doctrines of substantial compliance “Claim as presented” and futility. The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s granting of the demurrer.

The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s granting of the demurrer.

The appeals court found that the complaint did not allege that the plaintiff had served or attempted to serve a claim on any responsible officer of the school district. Therefore, the doctrine of substantial compliance did not apply. Furthermore, the appeals court found that, even assuming the grievance could be deemed to constitute a claim, its contents did not substantially comply with the requirements of the Government Claims Act because the grievance failed to include the address of the claimant, the address where future notices should be sent, the dollar amount claimed, and/or whether the claim was a limited civil case.

Should you have any questions concerning these court decisions or desire a copy of any of them, please do not hesitate to contact our office.

Sincerely,

DUMMIT, BUCHHOLZ & TRAPP

SCOTT D. BUCHHOLZ ESQ.