- (Medical Board Investigation) Business and Professions Section 2225 abrogates psychotherapist-patient privilege for purposes of medical board’s investigation of a psychiatrist, permitting disclosure of patient records. Cross v. Superior Court (Kidane). (No. B277600, Super. Ct. No. BS160696, California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division Five, May 1, 2017)
- (Involuntary Holds) Plaintiff subjected to involuntary 72-hour mental health hold unsuccessful in challenging judgment in defendants’ favor. Julian v. Mission Community Hospital. (No. B263563, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LC100529, California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, May 2, 2017)
- (Arbitration) Nonsignatory arbitration agreement may compel arbitration of employment dispute for claims covered under agreement pursuant to doctrines of equitable estoppel and agency. Garcia v. Pexco, LLC. (No. G052872 Super. Ct. No. 30-2014-00742230, California Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, May 16, 2017)
- (Vexatious Litigants) Frivolous appeal dismissed and expanded prefiling order and sanctions imposed on vexations litigant. Kinney v. Clark. (No. B265267, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC354136, California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division One, May 17, 2017)
- (Default Judgments) Default judgment should never have been entered in plaintiff’s favor, serving as reminder to courts to properly apply gatekeeper function. Grappo v. McMills. (No. A147522, Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG13702180, California Court of Appeals, First Appellate District, Division Two, May 23, 2017
- (Medical Fees) Cardiologist unsuccessful in challenging legal standard used by trial court in calculating reasonable value of his medical services. Sanjiv Goel MD, Inc. v. Regal Medical Group, Inc. (No. B267012, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC 543227, California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division One, May 23, 2017
- (Punitive Damages) Employer’s admission of vicarious liability does not shield it from punitive damages; employer nonetheless not subject to punitive damages due to lack of triable issues of fact. CRST, Inc. v. Superior Court (Lennig). (No. B280270, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MC025288, California Courts of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, May 26, 2017)
The above referenced matters have come to our attention during the last month. Please find below a brief summary of these newly issued opinions.
- (Medical Board Investigation) Business and Professions Section 2225 abrogates psychotherapist-patient privilege for purposes of medical board’s investigation of a psychiatrist, permitting disclosure of patient records. Cross v. Superior Court (Kidane). (No. B277600, Super. Ct. No. BS160696, California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division Five, May 1, 2017)
Petitioner physician who specializes in psychiatry was served with a subpoena for investigation by the California Medical Board. The medical board was investigating whether the petitioner prescribed controlled substances to three people who were ostensibly her patients. The petitioner refused to produce the subpoenaed medical records, citing the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the patient’s constitutional right to privacy. The California Medical Board filed a petition to compel compliance with the subpoenas, which the trial court granted, reasoning that a provision of the Medical Practice Act precluded petitioner from relying on the psychotherapist-patient privilege in a California Medical Board investigation, and that there was good cause to require production of the records notwithstanding the patient’s privacy rights. The appeals court addressed two issues: (1) the applicability of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in a medical board investigation into improper prescribing of controlled substances and (2) the sufficiency of the Medical Board’s showing to overcome the patient’s right to privacy.
The appeals court found that the records demanded by the Medical Board were not protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Evidence Code section 1014 sets forth psychotherapist-patient privilege. Business and Professions Code section 2225(a) provides that “the provisions of ‘any other law making communication between a physician… and his or her patients a privileged communication’ do not apply in an investigation conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Medical Practice Act.” On the issue of whether the petitioner could rely on the patient’s constitutional right to privacy, the appeals court agreed with the lower court’s conclusions.
- (Involuntary Holds) Plaintiff subjected to involuntary 72-hour mental health hold unsuccessful in challenging judgment in defendants’ favor. Julian v. Mission Community Hospital. (No. B263563, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LC100529, California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, May 2, 2017)
This action arose out of a series of events that began at a local school where the plaintiff taught, and ended at a hospital where the plaintiff was involuntarily detained for mental health evaluation and treatment. After her release, the plaintiff sued the school district and the school district police. She alleged that the school defendants did not have probable cause under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 to detain her. Plaintiff also sued the hospital, its owner, and the physician who treated her at the hospital, alleging that they lacked probable cause to continue to detain her and admit her to the hospital where she spent one night before she was released the next day. The plaintiff’s complaint sought monetary damages for various alleged violations of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Act) (section 5000 et. seq.) and of her civil rights under the federal and state constitutions. The trial court sustained the hospital’s demurrers to plaintiff’s third amended complaint and granted the school’s motion for summary judgment.
The appeals court concluded that there was no private right of action for violations of the Act. The appeals court also concluded the school district and the school police were immune from liability under Title 42 United States Code section 1983 (Civil Rights Act) based upon the officers being entitled to a qualified immunity, the hospital and physician were not state actors for purposes of plaintiff’s section 1983 claims, most of the provisions of the California Constitution plaintiff invoked did not create causes of action for damages, and plaintiff failed to state a claim for violations of those provisions that might provide such a cause of action. Finally, because the hospital defendants were not state actors for purposes of section 1983, they could not be held liable for plaintiff’s alleged violations of the California Constitution.
- (Arbitration) Nonsignatory arbitration agreement may compel arbitration of employment dispute for claims covered under agreement pursuant to doctrines of equitable estoppel and agency. Garcia v. Pexco, LLC. (No. G052872 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2014-00742230), California Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, May 16, 2017)
Plaintiff appealed from an order granting defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff opposed the motion on the ground that defendant was not a party to the arbitration agreement. The appeals court found that the plaintiff was equitably estopped from denying defendant’s right to arbitrate and the agency exception applied. The appeals court affirmed the order of the trial court compelling arbitration between the plaintiff and defendant.
This case involved a staffing company that hired plaintiff as an hourly employee and thereafter assigned him to work for defendant. As part of the hiring process with the staffing agency, plaintiff filled out an employment application that included an arbitration agreement. Plaintiff later filed a wage dispute against the staffing agency defendant and a third party alleging that “all defendants” committed various labor code violations. The staffing company and defendant successfully moved to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the defendant should not be allowed to compel arbitration because it was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement.
Under equitable estoppel, a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may compel arbitration of a dispute arising out of the scope of the agreement “when the causes of action against the non-signatory are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations.” Moreover, there’s a strong policy favoring arbitration. Here, plaintiff’s styled his complaint as “labor code violations.” The arbitration agreement nevertheless applied because labor code violations were clearly and expressly included in the agreement as a covered dispute. Further, plaintiff’s claims were intimately founded and intertwined with his employment relationship with the staffing agency and, given that he did not distinguish between the defendants, plaintiff was equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate his claims with the defendant.
- (Vexatious Litigants) Frivolous appeal dismissed and expanded prefiling order and sanctions imposed on vexations litigant. Kinney v. Clark. (No. B265267, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC354136, California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division One, May 17, 2017)
Cross-complainant appealed from a post-judgment award for attorney’s fees and costs that the cross-defendant incurred in a prior appeal while attempting to enforce an earlier award for attorney’s fees and costs against the cross-complainant. Cross-complainant had been challenging the cross-defendant’s entitlement to fees and costs in this action since 2008, when the trial court first awarded cross-defendant attorney’s fees and costs under a residential purchase agreement to which she and the cross-complainant were parties and under which the cross-complainant brought this unsuccessful cross-action against cross-defendant. This appeal, like the numerous appeals before, lacked merit according to the appeals court. The appeals court granted the cross-defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal because it was frivolous.
The Superior Court as well as the United States District Court all declared the cross-complainant to be a vexatious litigant. Under a prefiling order issued in 2011, cross-complainant, while still self-represented, could not file a new litigation including any writ or appeal in a California State court without first obtaining leave of the presiding judge. Undeterred, the cross-complainant retained a series of attorneys to represent him in his continued and unconscionable campaign in the courts against cross-defendant. The prefiling order covering cross-complainants in pro per litigation had been ineffective in constraining his vexatious litigation. Accordingly, on cross-defendant’s motion, the appeals court imposed an expanded prefiling order, requiring the cross-complainant to obtain leave of the presiding judge before filing new litigation (including any appeal or writ) against the cross-defendant or her attorney in a court of this state, even when he is represented by counsel. The prefiling order was necessary to protect the cross-defendant, her attorneys, and the courts from cross-complainant’s abuse of the judicial process. On the court’s own motion, the appeals court imposed monetary sanctions on the cross-complainant for filing a frivolous appeal in the sum of $10,000.
- (Default Judgments) Default judgment should never have been entered in plaintiff’s favor, serving as reminder to courts to properly apply gatekeeper function. Grappo v. McMills. (No. A147522 (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG13702180), California Court of Appeals, First Appellate District, Division Two, May 23, 2017
Plaintiff, representing himself, filed a complaint against multiple defendants. The complaint was served on an individual who was listed in the caption but not otherwise identified in the complaint. Six months later, plaintiff filed a request for default against this individual and his firm. The clerk entered default but the court refused to enter judgment. Subsequently, the individual died. Plaintiff, knowing that the individual had died, filed another request for default. The court entered judgment for the plaintiff and against the individual and his firm for $60,000 plus $750 in costs. The trustee of the individual’s trust, who learned of the default judgment when plaintiff filed a creditor’s claim in the individual’s estate, filed a motion to vacate the judgment. The trial court vacated the judgment as to the individual.
The appeals court affirmed, finding that the default judgment was not supported and should have never been entered. Plaintiff’s complaint failed to identify the parties in the action or his relationship to the defendants and failed to comply with the California Rules of Court. The plaintiff lacked standing to bring the asserted claims, and the complaint did not state a claim for any loss of property. Plaintiff’s counsel also admitted that the complaint did not state a cause of action. Thus, for all the reasons a default judgment was erroneous and the trial court properly concluded it could not stand.
- (Medical Fees) Cardiologist unsuccessful in challenging legal standard used by trial court in calculating reasonable value of his medical services. Sanjiv Goel MD, Inc. v. Regal Medical Group, Inc. (No. B267012, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC 543227, California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division One, May 23, 2017
Plaintiff, a physician, appealed from a judgment following a court trial on his quantum meruit claim for fees for emergency treatment rendered to four patients as an interventional cardiologist. The trial court found that the fees paid by the defendant medical group for his treatment reflected the reasonable value of the services that the plaintiff provided. The sole issue presented on appeal was whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in determining the reasonable value of the plaintiff’s services. The appeals court concluded that the court did use the correct standard and therefore affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
The patients who were treated by the plaintiff were covered by a medical plan for which the defendant was responsible. Plaintiff did not have a contract with the defendant and he billed the defendant for the procedures based on prices he determined himself. He billed the defendant over $275,000 for four patients’ procedures. He was paid approximately $10,000. Plaintiff sued the defendant to collect the difference between what he billed and what defendant paid asserting a single claim for quantum meruit.
The appeals court, citing Children’s Hospital Central California v. Blue Cross of California concluded that “payers should be reimbursed noncontracted providers based upon the ‘reasonable and customary value’ of their services.” Plaintiff argued that under Children’s Hospital, the reasonable value of the services was determined as a matter of law by the rates that he previously was successful in obtaining from prior payers. The court rejected this narrow reading, explaining that the standard was flexible and the trial court could properly consider defendant’s expert testimony that identified fees charged by other medical providers for similar emergency services. It was also reasonable for the trial court to conclude that Medicare reimbursement rates were relevant. Thus, because the trial court used the correct legal standard, this court affirmed.
- (Punitive Damages) Employer’s admission of vicarious liability does not shield it from punitive damages; employer nonetheless not subject to punitive damages due to lack of triable issues of fact. CRST, Inc. v. Superior Court (Lennig). (No. B280270, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MC025288, California Courts of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, May 26, 2017)
Plaintiff suffered serious injuries when a car he was traveling in was struck by defendant employee’s truck. Plaintiff sued the driver and the owner of the truck, asserting negligence claims and seeking punitive damages. Defendant trucking company admitted vicarious liability for the negligence of the driver. The driver and the trucking company both sought summary adjudication on the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. The trial court granted the employee’s motion for summary adjudication but denied the defendant trucking company’s motion. The trucking company sought relief from the appellate court arguing that the trial court erred in denying summary adjudication.
The appeals court granted the petition. The appeals court rejected the trucking company’s argument that, under Diaz v. Carcamo, the admission of vicarious liability barred the recovery of punitive damages. In Diaz, an employer’s admission of vicarious liability rendered the allegations regarding the employer’s misconduct superfluous. Notwithstanding, the appeals court found that there were no triable issues over whether the trucking company was subject to punitive damages under California Civil Code section 3294(b) standards. In this case, the appeals court affirmed that the record below in the trial court did not suggest that the trucking company authorized or ratified the trucking driver’s alleged misconduct. Further, the court found that there was no evidence that those individuals with information concerning the driver were “managing agents” for purposes of section 3294(b).
Should you have any questions concerning these court decisions or desire a copy of any of them, please do not hesitate to contact our office.
Sincerely,
DUMMIT, BUCHHOLZ & TRAPP
SCOTT D. BUCHHOLZ ESQ.