Skip to main content

California Law Update – August 2022

By August 31, 2022December 3rd, 2022Law Updates
  1. (Open and Obvious) Defendant owed no duty of care to plaintiff who willingly chose to encounter open and obvious dangerous condition without any practical necessity. Abel Montes, SR v. Young Men’s Christian Association of Glendale, California (No. B309454 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC688158 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed August 3, 2022)
  2. (Disability Discrimination) Student was not entitled to enhanced remedies available under the Unruh Civil Rights Act because a public school district is not a “business establishment” within the meaning of the Act. In the Supreme Court of California Brennon B. v. The Superior Court of California (West Contra Costa Unified School District (No. S266254 First Appellate District, Division One A157026 Contra Costa County Superior Court MSC1601005 Decided August 4, 2022)
  3. (Stipulated Judgment Damages) A stipulated judgment, which lessee agreed to accept to settle breach of lease agreement, was the exact amount of damages suffered, not a penalty or liquidated damage provision. Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ray Imani (2d Civil No. B316546 Super. Ct. No. 56-2013-00438287-CU-BA-VTA (Ventura County) California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Six Filed August 9, 2022)
  4. (Premises Liability) Plaintiff who was invited motorcycle riding on the family property by defendants’ live-in son could not impose premises liability on the parents since children are not automatically authorized to invite others onto the property. Hoffman v. Young ((2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1024 San Luis Obispo County Superior Court 16CVP0060, Second Appellate District, Div. Six B292539, Decided August 29, 2022)
  5. (Statutory Offers) Plaintiff’s conditional acceptance of her employer’s Section 998 offer did not create a binding enforceable settlement because the acceptance was not absolute and unqualified. Siri v. Sutter Home Winery, Inc. ((2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 598, Napa County Super. Ct. No. 26-59035, California Court of Appeal District Division Four Filed August 25, 2022)
  6. (Temporary Restraining Order) Workplace violence restraining order was reversed because there was insufficient evidence to support that bank customer would resort to violence against bank employee. Technology Credit Union v. Mathew Mehdi Rafat (No. H049471, Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 21CH009964, California Court of Appeal Sixth Appellate District, Filed August 17, 2022)
  7. (Third Party Criminal Act) School district was not negligent in its duty to protect students from foreseeable injury because criminal attack on school grounds by teacher’s estranged spouse was not foreseeable. C.I. v. San Bernardino City Unified School District (No. E076212 Super. Ct. No. CIVDS1725293, California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Div. Two, Filed September 6, 2022)

The above referenced court opinions have come to our attention during last month. Please find below a brief summary of these opinions for your consideration.

  1. (Open and Obvious) Defendant owed no duty of care to plaintiff who willingly chose to encounter open and obvious dangerous condition without any practical necessity. Abel Montes, SR v. Young Men’s Christian Association of Glendale, California (No. B309454 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC688158 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed August 3, 2022)

Plaintiff’s decedent fell to his death from a steep slope roof of a residential building where he lived. The building was owned by the defendant. The decedent had been drinking and had eaten a marijuana brownie earlier, was feeling high, and had been acting erratically before the fall. The parties agree that there was an “open and obvious risk” from the roof. The slope had a steep angle and was covered with brittle, broken, slippery and unstable Spanish tiles. They also agreed that there was no need for the decedent to be on the roof.

The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that under these circumstances, it owed no duty of care to the decedent. The trial court granted the motion on behalf of the defendant. Plaintiffs had contended that the defendant had a duty to remedy the open and obvious danger posed by the roof. The appeals court found that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the decedent would venture on to the obviously dangerous roof and therefore the defendant did not owe him a duty.

  1. (Disability Discrimination) Student was not entitled to enhanced remedies available under the Unruh Civil Rights Act because a public school district is not a “business establishment” within the meaning of the Act. In the Supreme Court of California Brennon B. v. The Superior Court of California (West Contra Costa Unified School District (No. S266254 First Appellate District, Division One A157026 Contra Costa County Superior Court MSC1601005 Decided August 4, 2022)

This matter was heard before the California Supreme Court. The plaintiff is a young man with developmental disabilities. When he was a teenager, he was a special-education student at defendant’s high school. The plaintiff alleged that during his time there, he was repeatedly sexually assaulted by other students and by a school district staff member. His guardian ad litem sued the district on his behalf, asserting various claims arising out of the plaintiff’s experiences at the high school, including claims that the district had violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civil Code Section 51 et. seq)(“Act”).

The question before the California Supreme Court was whether a plaintiff who asserts such claims can hold a public school district liable under the Act and thus avail him or herself of enhanced remedies, particularly statutory penalties, and attorney’s fees that the Act makes available. The California Supreme Court found that the Act’s protections and remedies were not available in such circumstances. It found that a public school district was not a “business establishment” within the meaning of the Act.

  1. (Stipulated Judgment Damages) A stipulated judgment, which lessee agreed to accept to settle breach of lease agreement, was the exact amount of damages suffered, not a penalty or liquidated damage provision. Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ray Imani (2d Civil No. B316546 Super. Ct. No. 56-2013-00438287-CU-BA-VTA (Ventura County) California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Six Filed August 9, 2022)

Defendant appealed an order denying his motion to vacate a judgement entered against him for over $250,000 after he failed to pay $30,000 as required pursuant to a stipulation for entry of judgement. The defendant contended the trial court erred because the judgement was an unenforceable penalty and was therefore void. The appeals court affirmed the trial courts ruling. The stipulated judgment which the defendant agreed to accept was the exact amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff. The court refused to adopt the defendant’s characterization of the stipulated judgement as a penalty and/or liquidated damage provision. The appeals court noted that a person should not be rewarded for a breach of contract. The defendant in this case had taken the benefit of the original lease. It gave him a long-term lease for what the court assumed was the market price for a commercial real property lease. He also took benefit of a settlement agreement. This was an extremely favorable financial settlement. And now after years of defaults, the defendant sought the benefit of the settlement agreement. The court noted that if it were to reverse, this would, in essence, be a decree awarding specific performance of a 2015 stipulated judgement. The defendant did not act equitably. The appeals court thus affirmed the order denying the motion to vacate the judgement.

  1. (Premises Liability) Plaintiff who was invited motorcycle riding on the family property by defendants’ live-in son could not impose premises liability on the parents since children are not automatically authorized to invite others onto the property. Hoffman v. Young ((2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1024 San Luis Obispo County Superior Court 16CVP0060, Second Appellate District, Div. Six B292539, Decided August 29, 2022)

The California Supreme Court was asked to resolve an issue concerning Civil Code section 846, which provides that landowners generally owe no duty of care to keep their property safe for others who may enter or use it for recreational purposes. There is an exception to that statutory negation of duty, however, when a landowner expressly invites someone on to the property. The question in this case was whether that exception applied when the invitation is extended, not by the landowners, but by their live at home child who acts without the owner’s knowledge or permission. The trial court ruled that the exception did not apply because there was no evidence the landowners personally invited the plaintiff to come on to their land. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that an invitation by a landowner’s live at home child operates to activate the exception unless the child has been prohibited from making that invitation. The California Supreme Court reversed holding that a plaintiff may rely on an exception and impose liability if there is a showing that a landowner, or an agent acting on their behalf, extended an express invitation to come on to the property. Plaintiff did not meet that burden below, as the live at home child could not be considered an agent of the landowner. Thus, the California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgement and remanded the matter.

  1. (Statutory Offers) Plaintiff’s conditional acceptance of her employer’s Section 998 offer did not create a binding enforceable settlement because the acceptance was not absolute and unqualified. Siri v. Sutter Home Winery, Inc. ((2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 598, Napa County Super. Ct. No. 26-59035, California Court of Appeal District Division Four Filed August 25, 2022)

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court granted a motion by defendant to enforce a settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 (section 998). Plaintiff contended the judgement must be reversed because the court exceeded its authority by purporting to adjudicate whether the party offering an acceptance formed at binding agreement. The appeals court determined the trial court erred in holding that section 998 agreement had been reached. In this case, the defendant offered a compromise pursuant to section 998. However, the parties disputed whether plaintiff’s acceptance would trigger a right to prejudgment interest. Plaintiff filed a notice of conditional acceptance of the 998 offer, as well as objections to the section 998 offer. The trial court had rejected the motion for entry of judgment of conditional acceptance and granted the defendants motion for entry of the amount of the section 998 offer since the plaintiff had accepted the section 998 settlement via a conditional acceptance. The appeals court in reversing the trial court found that the plaintiff’s conditional acceptance was not so absolute and unqualified that it created a binding settlement because she explicitly conditioned her acceptance on the trial courts clarification regarding prejudgment interest. The fact that the trial court eventually denied a request for prejudgment interest did not change the conditional and unenforceable nature of her acceptance. Accordingly, the defendant’s judgment of dismissal was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

  1. (Temporary Restraining Order) Workplace violence restraining order was reversed because there was insufficient evidence to support that bank customer would resort to violence against bank employee. Technology Credit Union v. Mathew Mehdi Rafat (No. H049471, Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 21CH009964, California Court of Appeal Sixth Appellate District, Filed August 17, 2022)

Defendant challenged a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (Section 527.8) issued against him at the request of the plaintiff to protect plaintiff’s employees. Defendant asserted that the WVRO must be reversed because there is no evidence he made a credible threat of violence against plaintiff’s employee as required to support a WVRO. The appeals court agreed the evidence was insufficient to show the defendant made a credible threat, and therefore reversed the WVRO. The underlying facts involved a visibly angry and aggressive defendant towards plaintiff’s employee while she was assisting him as a bank teller. The defendant made a video recording of her without her consent, made several rude and inappropriate statements questioning her mental competency, and assaulted her when he forced a pen and paper back towards her and demanded that she write down his number. The employee believed that due to the defendant’s aggression and later efforts to cause her harm by posting the video of their interaction on YouTube, defendant would come back and seek her out at the plaintiff’s branch. Following the incident, defendant sent emails to the employee’s supervisor complaining about his interaction with her. However, the only threats he made were of litigation and complaints to a federal agency. The appeals court found that there was insufficient evidence support that a reasonable person would believe that the defendant would resort to violence against the plaintiff’s employee and reversed the WVRO.

  1. (Third Party Criminal Act) School district was not negligent in its duty to protect students from foreseeable injury because criminal attack on school grounds by teacher’s estranged spouse was not foreseeable. C.I. v. San Bernardino City Unified School District (No. E076212 Super. Ct. No. CIVDS1725293, California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Div. Two, Filed September 6, 2022)

This action arose from a shooting on school premises. A man entered his spouse’s classroom at an elementary school which is part of defendant’s school district. The man shot and killed his wife, a student, and himself in front of the class of students. Plaintiffs, made up of students from the class initiated a lawsuit against defendant’s school district and the school’s principal alleging negligence and dangerous condition of the property. Defendant moved for summary judgement on the grounds they owed no duty to plaintiffs because the actions of third party were unforeseeable, the school property was not in dangerous condition because there was no defect, and the third party was not using the school property with due care. The trial court agreed, and judgment was entered in defendant’s favor.

The plaintiffs appealed contending that the defendant had a duty to take reasonable steps to protect students from criminal activity, and the defendant created a dangerous condition by failing to lock the front office door and equip classrooms doors that locked.

In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the appeals court found that there was no evidence that the school district had actual knowledge that the man posed a risk of harm to his spouse or anyone else at the school. He had previously visited the school without incident, and the spouse never expressed concerns to anyone about his potential for violence or her safety. Accordingly, the appeals court found that the case presented nothing more than a mere possibility of occurrence, and no district employee could have foreseen that the man was a danger to the safety of the school.

Should you have any questions concerning these court decisions or desire a copy of any of them, please do not hesitate to contact our office.